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I. INTRODUCTION

General partnership law in the United States, although comparable to English law in
many respects, has long differed on a fundamental question: If a partner wishes to
terminate membership in a partnership, is the partner bound by a prior agreement to
remain a member of the partnership? Different answers to this basic question carry
corollary consequences for other provisions within partnership legislation. These
differences have persisted through the twentieth century and remain evident in
contemporary partnership legislation in the United States as contrasted with the reform
alternatives for English partnership law presented recently by the Law Commissions in
their Consultation Paper on Partnership (Consultation Paper).1 The thesis of this Article
is that partnership legislation in each country strikes a different balance in the inevitable
trade-offs between stability for the partnership association and risk as perceived by each
individual partner. These trade-offs make the general partnership in the United States less
stable as a form of business association, but also reduce certain risks otherwise borne by
individual partners.
The law applicable to general partnerships is a rich source of legal puzzles because
the underlying concepts draw on doctrine from contract, agency, and property, and do so
in ways that reveal tensions among them. In particular, elements of partnership law
drawn from contract law may be at odds with partnership's inclusion of elements drawn
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Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. This Article is based on a public lecture given
at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, London, March 2001. I am grateful to the audience, and to
Professors Evelyn Brody, Paul Davies, and Judith Freedman, for comments and suggestions.
1.

LAW COMM'N &

SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, PARTNERSHIP LAW: A JOINT CONSULTATION PAPER

(2000). Throughout this Article, references are to "English" partnership law. The intention is to exclude any
reference to the Scottish law of partnership. Partnership law in England and Wales differs materially from
Scottish law. See id. at 8-9.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Summier

from the common law of agency. Different elements dominate partnership law in
England compared with the United States. This Article begins by discussing the basic
similarities in partnership law in the two countries, 2 followed by the major difference. 3
The Article then examines the consequences that follow from this difference and
identifies points on which further empirical research would be illuminating.4
Before examining the legal specifics, consider as an initial matter an analogy or
visual metaphor. The points of partnership law examined in this Article involve what may
be termed architectural features or choices-basic decisions concerning the structure of
the relationship among parties and their rights and powers as defined in large measure by
the statute applicable to a particular type of business association. Architectural features in
the law of business associations have consequences that pervade the particular body of
law and explain many of its specific provisions. By analogy, an architect designing a
vaulted building, at least one capable of standing for any appreciable time, develops a
design that counteracts the forces of compression and tension that push downward and
pull outward on the vault. Unsuccessful vaulted buildings fail to play compression and
tension off against each other and channel these forces safely to the ground. Designs for
successful vaults-like the Pantheon and the domed cathedral in Florence-can span vast
spaces, but the design's solution to the basic problem tends to implicate many other
visual and functional elements in the building. 5 For example, the coffers in the ceiling of
the Pantheon's dome, a memorable visual feature, also lighten the load that the dome
imposes. Likewise, the law applicable to any particular form of business association
reflects a series of choices-whether made explicitly or implicitly-about basic structural
questions; consequences of these basic choices are diffused throughout applicable law.
II.

STATUTORY SIMILARITIES

To place the differences between English and U.S. partnership law in context, it is
important to begin by identifying common features of general partnership law in the two
countries. In both countries, general partnership legislation covers the same subjectmatter. In England, partnership is defined in section 1(1) of the Partnership Act of 1890
as "the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a
view to profit." 6 The counterpart definition in U.S. legislation characterizes a partnership
as an "association" and partners as "co-owners" who carry on a business for profit. These
definitions do not differ materially in the subject-matter covered by partnership law. 7

2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part Ii.
See infra Part Ill.
See infra Parts IV-V.
ROss KING, BRUNELLESCHI'S DOME: HOW A RENAISSANCE GENIUS REINVENTED ARCHITECTURE
28-

31 (2000).
6. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 1(1) (Eng.).
7. The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (UPA) defines a partnership in section 6(1) as "an association of

two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNIF. P'SHtP' ACT § 6(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A.

56 (1995). Under section 202(a) of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 (RUPA), "the association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the
persons intend to form a partnership." REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT

2001).

§

202(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 56 (Supp.
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Similarly, both countries' legislation contains provisions comparable in substance that
exclude from the scope of the general definition of partnership certain relationships in
which a person receives a share in the profits of a business, such as repayment of a loan
in amounts that vary with the profitability of a business. However, such a person is not to
be treated as a partner. 8 Moreover, in both countries partners in a general partnership are
its agents and as such hold power to bind the firm. In the words of the Partnership Act of
1890, a partnership is bound by "any act for carrying on in the usual way business of the
kind carried on by the firm... unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority...
and the person with whom he is dealing either knows that he has no authority, or does not
know or believe him to be a partner." 9 Finally, in both countries general partners have
One consequence of characterizing partnership as a "relation" as opposed to an "association" is the
need for additional terminology. Section 4(1) in the Partnership Act of 1890 provides that "[p]ersons who have
entered into partnership with each other are for purposes of this Act called collectively a firm, and the name
under which their business is carried on is called the firm-name." Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, §
4(1) (Eng.). In contrast, the UPA and RUPA do not use the "firm" terminology.
8. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54, c. 39, § 2 (Eng.); UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 7 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 280
(1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2001).
9. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 5 (Eng.). Under the Partnership Act of 1890, a partner is
an agent of fellow partners as well as an agent of the firm. Id. In contrast, the UPA and RUPA characterize a
partner as an agent only of "the partnership." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 9 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 400 (1995); REV. UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT § 301(1) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 60 (Supp. 2001). Thus, partners in partnerships subject to U.S.
law are not each other's "mutual agents" although they may be individually liable for obligations of the
partnership that fellow partners have incurred. Moreover, in both jurisdictions, a partner who wishes to
"revoke" the authority of her fellow partners may do so only by dissolving the partnership or disassociating
a step that carries many complex consequences and that English law limits to partnerships at will. In
from it,
contrast with the common law of agency, a partner's manifestation of intent to revoke a fellow partner's
authority is ineffective. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
The U.S. legislation makes a partner's apparent authority dependent upon the scope of the partnership
business and does not additionally condition it on whether the third-party knew or believed the actor to be a
partner. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 9 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 400-01 (1995).
(1)

Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of
every partner... for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership
of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is
dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.

An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business of the
partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless authorized by the other
partners.
Id. Sections 301(1) and (2) of RUPA are comparable, except in two respects. Section 301(1) makes explicit that
a partner's apparent authority includes acts for carrying on in the ordinary course "business of the kind carried
on by the partnership," not just a partnership's particular business. REV. UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 301(1) (1994), 6
U.L.A. 33 (1995) (emphasis added). Section 301(2) permits a partnership to limit the risk created by
unauthorized acts by providing a notification to a third party that states the restrictions imposed on a partner's
authority. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301(2) (1994), 6 U.L.A. 33-34 (1995). RUPA section 102(d) provides that a
notification is effective upon its delivery to a person's place of business or other place that the person designates
to receive communications. Id. § 102(d) (1994), 6 U.L.A. 43 (1995). The point is to make the effectiveness of
restrictions on authority independent of a showing of actual knowledge. See id. § 102 official cmt. 3, 6 U.L.A.
43 (1995).
In contrast, the last part of section 5 in the Partnership Act of 1890 carries the implication that if a
third party who does not know that the person with whom dealing occur is a member of a partnership, fellow
partners are not liable for the obligation resulting from the partner's dealings with the third party. If so, section
(2)
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individual liability for obligations incurred by the partnership. 10 This is commonly
treated as a fundamental and defining element of a general partnership. Indeed, the
drafter of the 1914 uniform partnership legislation in the United States, William Draper
Lewis, wrote that the element of individual liability is "the idea of every business man
who deals with a partnership, that he is dealing with a group of persons who are directly
and unlimitedly liable for partnership obligations." 1 1
A brief historical note may help here. The 1914 statute was highly successful;
almost every state enacted legislation closely patterned on it. 12 This made partnership law
less susceptible to state-by-state variation than other bodies of law, such as corporate law.
The effect of the 1914 statute was long-lived as well. The early 1990s saw the completion
of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), now the basis for legislation in many
states, some embodying significant departures from the proposed uniform provisions. 13
The original project that culminated in the 1914 uniform legislation did not have an
entirely auspicious beginning. The first drafter, James Barr Ames, died mid-way into the
project. Sad enough in itself, but his underlying theory, as well as his draft, diverged
markedly from what appear to have been Lewis's views. As the language just quoted may
imply, Lewis was committed to the view that a general partnership is necessarily an
aggregate of discrete persons as opposed to an entity having a distinct juridical
personality. Ames, in contrast, was a proponent of treating general partnerships as legal
entities distinct from their members. Following Ames's death, and Lewis's appointment
as his successor, Lewis gave advisers to the project two alternative drafts from which to
choose, one drawn on the entity premise and the other on the aggregate premise. The
advisors sided with Lewis, perhaps persuaded by his argument that it would, at the least,
be cumbersome to explain how partners can have individual liability (a proposition to
which Ames was also committed) when a third party has acquired rights and liabilities
that in the first instance bind the partnership as an entity. 14 Almost a century later, RUPA
5 rejects the common-law doctrine of the undisclosed principal, as stated and applied in Watteau v. Fenwick. I
Q.B. 346 (1893). For discussion of alternative interpretations of section 5, along with cases and commentary
supportive of applying undisclosed principal doctrine in this context, see GEOFFREY MORSE, PARTNERSHIP
LAW 86-89 (4th ed. 1998).
10. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 9 (Eng.); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT. § 15 (1914), 6 U.L.A.
456 (1995); REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §306(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2001).
11. William D. Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 641 (1915). Cf.Allen W. Vestal,
.. Drawing Near the Fastness?" The Failed United States Experiment in UnincorporatedBusiness Entity
Reform, 26 J. CORP.L. 1019, 1029 (2001). Vestal notes that a decade of changes produced:
a widening gap between the popular conception of the partnership relationship and the legal
restatement of the concept. It is my sense that the popular conception of the partnership
relationship is much closer to the tort-based, relationship-driven model under the UPA and the
common law than it is to the contract-based, immediate self-interest model under RUPA.
Id.
12. The sole exception is Louisiana. The Civil Code defines a partnership as "a juridical person, distinct
from its partners, created by a contract between two or more persons to combine their efforts or resources in
determined proportions and to collaborate at mutual risk for their common profit or commercial benefit." LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2801 (2001).
13. For instances of non-uniform provisions in states that have otherwise adopted RUPA, see Vestal,
supra note 11, at 1027-28 nn.55-67 and accompanying text.
14. See Lewis, supra note 11, at 640-41. Lewis wrote that the entity theory, "while it enables us to solve
the rights of the separate judgment creditor of a partner in the partnership property, it makes it impossible to
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overcame this particular problem by distinguishing between primary and secondary
liability. RUPA provides that a partnership creditor may not levy execution against the
individual assets of a partner, otherwise liable on a claim, unless the creditor has first
partnership itself and "that judgment has been returned
recovered a judgment against the
15
unsatisfied in whole or in part."
It is clear that Lewis and Ames were aware of the formulations in the Partnership
Act of 1890, to the extent of using the statute as an interim drafting model in some
respects. The 1890 statute originated with the work of Sir Frederick Pollock, who in 1879
drafted the initial bill to consolidate the law of partnership. 16 Lewis recounts that
although in early drafts the wording of the English statute was followed verbatim, by the
end of the project it was redrafted to reduce the language "to as simple a form as
possible." 17 Lewis takes particular authorial pride in having reduced, to twelve lines, the
Partnership Act's one-page treatment of when a recipient of a share in profits is not a
partner. 18
III. THE MAJOR DISPARITY
Against this background, it is significant that the U.S. legislation departed from the
1890 Act in one basic respect, a divergence that continues in RUPA. Under the
Partnership Act of 1890, as under the U.S. legislation, a general partnership is a relatively
fragile form of business association because there are many circumstances that will cause
a partnership to dissolve. These circumstances include the death of an individual partner
19
and an agreement among partners to dissolve.

work out in a satisfactory way the rights of a firm creditor against the separate property of a partner." Id. at 640.
Lewis additionally argued that treating partnerships as entities would entail the creation of a system of
registration. See id. at 641. However, RUPA, which treats partnerships as entities, does not require registration.
See REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 55 (Supp. 2001) (stating that a partnership is an
entity distinct from its members).
15. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 307(d) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 2001). Comparable legislation
in some states preceded RUPA. See, e.g., Security Bank v. McCoy, 361 N.W.2d 514 (Neb. 1985) (applying
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-316 (1985)); see also LAW CoMM'N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 1,at 137-40
(proposing alternate reform in which partnership's liability is primary and that of individual partners is
secondary). Under RUPA, a creditor may not satisfy a judgment against a partnership from the individual assets
of a partner unless the creditor has also obtained a judgment against that partner. REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
307.(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 2001). In contrast, one of the Law Commission's proposals is that a
creditor be permitted to enforce a judgment against a partnership directly against a partner's assets without
obtaining a judgment against that partner. See LAW COMM'N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, supranote 1,at 140.
16. See R1C. I'ANSON BANKS, LINDLEY & BANKS ON PARTNERSHIP 4 (17th ed. 1995). In 1865, legislation
known as "Bovill's Act" clarified distinctions between partnership and various forms of debtor-creditor
relationships. Sections 2 and 3 of the Partnerhsip Act of 1890 contain the substance of Bovill's Act. See MORSE,
supra note 9, at 36. For a discussion of how best to characterize partnership legislation, see infra text
accompanying notes 36-40.
17. See Lewis, supra note ll,at 621.
18. See id. (comparing section 2 of the Partnership Act of 1890 with section 7 of the UPA).
19. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, §§ 32-35 (Eng.) (stating circumstances under which
dissolution will occur); UNIF. P'sHIp ACT § 29 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 752 (1995) (defining dissolution as "the change
in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished
from the winding up of the business"); id. §§ 31-32, 6 U.L.A. 771-883 (1995) (stating causes of dissolution and
when dissolution may be ordered by a court).

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Summer

Dissolution is a complex idea and body of doctrine. Its basic effect is to terminate
the association among partners, which creates a right in individual partners to their share
(net of claims owing to third parties and to other partners) of partnership property. 20
Partners who wish to carry on post-dissolution may do so by forming a new partnership,
but the claims incident to settling-up may erect practical obstacles to this course. 2 1
The intriguing difference among statutes is the effect each gives to a partner's stated
intention or will to dissolve when no other ground for dissolution is present. Section 32 of
the Partnership Act of 1890 provides that such notice is effective to dissolve a partnership
when it has been entered into for an undefined term. 22 In contrast, a partner's notice of
intention to dissolve is ineffective when a partnership has been formed for a fixed term
and that term has not yet expired, or when the partnership has been formed for a specific
undertaking that has not yet been completed. 23 In a partnership that is not a partnership at
will, an agreement among partners is a requisite for dissolution unless some other
circumstance causes dissolution. Further, a partner's notice to third parties that the
partner shall no longer be bound by co-partners' acts is not operative when the notice is
ineffective to dissolve the partnership. 24 In contrast, under section 31(2) of the UPA, an
individual partner's express will to dissolve effects dissolution when no other
circumstance permits dissolution. 25 This is true even when the dissolution contravenes a
provision in the partnership agreement, as in a partnership for a fixed term or the
26
completion of a specific project.
Moreover, this basic difference persists in RUPA. The drafters of RUPA were
concerned with developing terminology that distinguished between a partner's departure
from the firm and the "various aspects of the process of disengagement from the
relationship."'27 A partner who departs from the firm "disassociates" under RUPA. 2 8
"Dissolution" follows only when the partnership's business is wound-up. Although
RUPA's consequences are not identical to those created by the UPA in all respects, a
partner has the power to disassociate at any time by giving express notice that the partner

20. See UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 38(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 880 (1995); REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 807(b)
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 118-19 (Supp. 2001). The relationship between these rights and provisions in the
partnership agreement is discussed infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
21. For example, the partners who wish to continue the business in a newly-formed partnership may be
unable to fund the purchase of the old partnership's assets.
22. Cases have defined a partnership with no fixed term to include a partnership in which partners have
agreed that no dissolution may occur except by mutual agreement. See Moss v. Elphick, I K.B. 846 (1910). In
effect, any agreement that limits a partner's right to dissolve by giving notice creates a partnership for a fixed
term. See MORSE, supra note 9, at 32-33. It is open to debate whether such an agreement exists. See id. at 33.
23. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 32(a)-(b) (Eng.).
24. See BANKS, supra note 16, at 393-94 (noting that the Partnership Act itself is silent on whether a
partner may unilaterally revoke the authority of a co-partner). Giving notice of a purported revocation may
constitute a repudiatory breach of the partnership agreement, which would entitle the innocent partners to
choose whether to affirm the agreement or treat the partnership as ended. Id. at 697. The effect of repudiation is
discussed further infra notes 34-35.
25. See UNW. P'SHIP ACT § 31(2) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 771 (1995).
26. Id.
27. Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters'
Overview, 49 Bus. LAW. 1, 7 (1993).
28. See REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 2001).
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so intends, even when the dissolution is wrongful because it breaches a provision of the
29
partnership agreement.
These basic differences illustrate the intellectual linkages between partnership, on
the one hand, and concepts and doctrines drawn from the common law and the tensions
among them on the other. The choice made by the Partnership Act of 1890 reflects the
dominance of contract. 30 Partners lack the power to dissolve in contravention of their
agreement as a consequence of the contract made at the formation of the partnership. As a
result, relationships among partners, third parties, and partnership property should be
more stable. Third parties that deal with the partnership are assured that the group that
comprises the partnership will remain members consistent with the terms of the
agreement, barring an occurrence like a partner's death. They are also assured that,
although many circumstances may diminish the value of partnership assets, a partner's
wrongful dissociation will not be such a circumstance.
This stability should be of benefit to partners as well. Fellow partners are assured
that a colleague may not leave the partnership simply by expressing the intention that it
dissolve. This in turn provides an assurance of ongoing association. Moreover, fellow
partners should benefit from stability even though a court will not grant an order of
specific performance compelling an unwilling partner to continue to provide services to a
partnership. 31 If partners are unable to dissolve a partnership in contravention of their
agreement, individual partners lose the ability to safeguard their individual resources
against obligations that the partnership may incur following their departure from the firm.
This is a relevant consideration given the joint and several nature of partners' individual
liability.32 That is, it is in all the partners' best interests to know that the individual assets
of their fellow partners will remain available throughout the duration of the partnership
and as against the liabilities that may ensue thereafter. Nonetheless, this assurance is not
complete under the Partnership Act of 1890 because a partnership may dissolve, for
example, as a consequence of a partner's death or bankruptcy. In any event, the Law
Commission's reform proposals are consistent with this point and, as discussed below,
33
develop the underlying point further than does the 1890 statute.

29. Id. § 601(1), 6 U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 2001); id. § 602(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 77 (1995).
30. Commentators on English partnership law emphasize its contractual nature. See, e.g., MORSE, supra
note 9, at 4.
31. See C. H. Giles & Co., Ltd. v. Morris, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 307, 317-19 (Ch. 1971) (discussing the bases
for judicial reluctance to grant specific enforcement of contract involving more than a minor element of
personal services or continuous personal services); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981)
(stating that promise to render personal services will not be specifically enforced); id. cmt. b (discussing the
definition of personal service); see also BANKS, supra note 16, at 617-18 nn.39-42 (stating that court would not
decree specific performance of agreement for partnership at will, nor would court decree specific performance
of agreement to perform personal services); Robert W. Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships,37 U. FLA. L. REv.
691, 733 (1985) (noting that "although a court will not compel an individual to perform services on behalf of
another.., limitations on the availability of specific performance do not require the free dissolvability of
partnerships" because a partner's involvement in a partnership may take a form other than provision of
services).
32. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, §§ 9, 12 (Eng.).
33. The Consultation Paper specifically considers whether "a partner in a partnership of defined duration
should have a right to withdraw" when the partnership agreement itself does not confer such a right. It
provisionally rejects this possibility because "[t]he partners will have contracted to be in the partnership for a
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Another implication of the dominance accorded to a contract is that a partner's
repudiation of the partnership contract should not terminate the contract and convert the
partnership into one at will. If the innocent partners wish to dissolve following the
repudiation, some other route toward dissolution should be identified, such as an
agreement among the partners or an application to the court for an order dissolving the
partnership. 34 Otherwise, if a partner repudiates the partnership contract, partners who
wish to continue the partnership are denied the financial stability for which they
contracted originally, if risk averse partners may exit freely in the wake of the partner
35
who initially repudiated the contract.
To be sure, one might wonder how comprehensively a partnership statute should be
understood to control the resolution of partnership-related disputes and whether the
statute ousts the applicability of common-law doctrines completely or only partially. A
full answer to this difficult question is beyond the modest scope of this Article. As points
of departure, though, one might consider the nature of partnership legislation and how the
legislation itself addresses the possible applicability of other bodies of law. The
Partnership Act of 1890 has been characterized as substantially "declaratory" in nature
because its intention was largely to restate principles already developed in common-law
and equity cases. 3 6 Although the UPA largely restates preceding law, in some respects it
also reflects more choice among competing rules because its drafters considered and
resolved points of doctrinal divergence among states. 37 Both statutes expressly
contemplate that other bodies of law may be applicable to partnerships. The Partnership
Act of 1890 preserves in section 46 "[t]he rules of equity and common law applicable to
partnership ... except so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this
Act." 38 The UPA provides that "[i]n any case not provided for in this act, the rules of law
and equity, including the law merchant, shall govem. ''3 9 RUPA provides that "[u]nless
displaced by particular provisions of this [Act], the principles of law and equity
supplement" the Act.40 These formulations are not identical; the standard in the
Partnership Act of 1890 is inconsistency, compared with whether a case is "provided for"
in the UPA, and whether legal principle is "displaced" by RUPA. Of the three
formulations, the inconsistency standard in the Partnership Act of 1890 is arguably the
friendliest to applying extra-statutory law. In contrast, the UPA may contain provisions
that can be interpreted to "provide for" a case by generating a rule for decision by
analogy or by extension.
defined term; the law should respect that contract." LAW COMM'N & ScOI-ISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 1, at
66.
34. See id. at 70. This argument is contrary to the dictum in Hurst v. Bryk [2000] 2 W.L.R. 740, 746-50
(H.L.) (stating that a repudiatory breach terminates the partnership contract). The dictum continues, however,
with the reservation that the termination of the partnership contract does not automatically dissolve the
partnership because the equitable jurisdiction of the court to decree dissolution should not be circumvented. Id.
35. If a partner wrongfully repudiates a partnership agreement, fellow partners no longer owe fiduciary
duties to the partner who repudiated. See MORSE, supra note 9, at 111-12.
36. See id. at 3-4.
37. See Lewis, supra note !1, at 623. However, the dearth of precedent in many states and confusion in
legal theory were more important causes of confusion in the common law of partnership in the United States. Id.
38. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 46 (Eng.).
39. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 5(1914), 6 U.L.A. 254 (1995).
40. REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 104(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 47 (Supp. 2001).
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In any event, one might accord controlling effect to the statute on matters that it
addresses explicitly or by ready implication. These include the causes of dissolution,
which partnership legislation itself specifies. It is inconsistent with statutory specification
of the circumstances that cause dissolution to import an additional cause by applying
common-law contract doctrines, such as anticipatory repudiation.
In contrast with its English counterpart, partnership legislation in the United States
assigns dominance to the agency elements in partnership. As noted above, all partners are
the firm's agents, and when a partner's act binds the partnership, it creates individual
liability for all partners. A defining element in the common law of agency, in England as
well as the United States, is the power held by both principal and agent to terminate an
agent's actual authority. The principal terminates by revoking authority, while the agent
terminates by renouncing it. 4 1 From the standpoint of a principal, the power to revoke
authority is a basic measure to control the agent and self-protect against the risks present
in a relationship in which another person's actions carry direct legal consequences for
oneself. From the standpoint of an agent, the power to renounce authority enables the
agent to move on to other activities and associations. The common law of agency
recognizes the effect of revocation and renunciation even when they contravene a
contract between principal and agent. The effect is to empower principal and agent to act
on assessments of risk and self-interest that occur subsequent to an initial agreement
between them.
In commenting on the 1914 uniform legislation as its drafter, Lewis wrote simply
and declaratively that, "[t]he relation of partners is one of agency. The agency is such a
personal one that equity cannot enforce it even where the agreement provides that the
partnership shall continue for a definite time." 42 Lewis also noted that uncertainty on the
point had preceded the statute's resolution and that "[t]he English law is opposed to this
view." 43 The practical insights in the partnership context are that the ability to exit from
the partnership is relevant to downside scenarios as well as upside scenarios. On the
downside, the ability to exit at any time enables a partner to cut off the risk stemming
from post-dissolution liabilities, at least once third parties have notice that the partner has
left the firm. On the upside, having left the partnership, the former partner no longer owes
fiduciary duties to former colleagues (excepting duties that follow the possession of
confidential information) and, subject to contractual restraints, is free to compete and
pursue opportunities that would otherwise fall within the partnership's ambit. In contrast,
a contract-dominated view binds parties more tightly to their initial assessments of risk
and self-interest.

41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2,2001); see generally Francis
Reynolds, When is an Agent's Authority Irrevocable?, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
ROY GOODE 259 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997).

42. See Lewis, supra note 11, at 628. This passage continues: "The power of any partner to terminate the

relation, even though [in] doing so he breaks a contract, should, it is submitted, be recognized." Id.

43. Id. at 627n.8.
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IV. MITIGATING ELEMENTS

A. United States
This Article has characterized the difference between general partnership law in the
United States and England as involving an "architectural" feature of partnership law, a
basic design choice that carries many corollary consequences. 44 Either choice has the
potential to create harsh consequences, which various provisions in each statute may
mitigate. Consider first the consequences of the agency-dominated design of the U.S.
legislation. If a partner has power to dissolve at any time in contravention of the
partnership agreement, the partner might use the power, or threaten to use it, when fellow
partners will be unable to carry on the partnership's business. Upon dissolution, a partner
has the right to receive that partner's share of partnership assets, minus the partner's
share of liabilities. 45 Partners who wish to carry on the business may be unable to raise
the cash requisite to buy out the share of the partner who has dissolved. This prospect
may create leverage in bargaining for opportunistic partners who threaten to dissolve
unless fellow partners agree to sweeten the terms of the partnership agreement to the
benefit of the partner who threatens dissolution. This consequence follows because the
structure of partnership law also draws on property concepts by specifying circumstances
under which a partner may compel the sale or division of partnership assets to complete a
winding-up. 4 6 A partner's premature withdrawal may also damage the partnership by
reducing the willingness of third parties to deal with the shrunken firm or by leading third
parties to demand better terms to induce them to deal.
Accordingly, both the UPA and RUPA contain provisions that reduce the risks that
wrongful dissolution and dissociation would otherwise impose on fellow partners. Under
both statutes, partners who have not wrongfully dissolved or dissociated have a claim
against their now-former partner for damages caused by the dissolution or dissociation,
which is to be subtracted from the now-former partner's account. 47 Additionally, some
courts developed doctrines of bad-faith dissolution or dissolution in contravention of a
partner's fiduciary duty. The leading case, Page v. Page, held that a partner's power to
dissolve a partnership, "like any power held by a fiduciary, must be exercised in good

44. See supra Part I.
45. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 880 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 807(b)
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 118-19 (Supp. 2001). The relationship between these rights and provisions in the
partnership agreement is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 60-61.
46. In this respect general partnership shares some of the instabilities of tenancies in common. In U.S. law,
a tenancy in common carries the risk that a co-owner will seek a partition by sale, which will oust the other coowners unless they purchase the property. For an extended treatment of this problem and its more general
implications, see generally Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001).
47. See UNIF. P'SH1P ACT § 38(2)(a)(II), (c)(II) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 880-81 (1995); REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
602(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 2001). RUPA is a bit kinder to partners who wrongfully dissociate
because it does not exclude partnership goodwill in calculating the value of the wrongfully dissociated partner's
partnership interest. Under RUPA, if the partnership's goodwill is damaged by the wrongful dissociation, the
amount of damage is offset against the buyout price received by the wrongfully dissociated partner. Compare
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(c)(I1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 881 (1995), with REV. UNIF. P'SHiP ACT §§ 602(c) & cmt. 3,
6 U.L.A. 98 (1995), and id. § 701 cmt. 3 (1994), 6 U.L.A. 102 (1995).
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faith."'48 RUPA does not explicitly address whether a partner's power to dissociate is
subject to a good-faith or fiduciary-duty limit.4 9 Both RUPA and the UPA enable
partners who have not wrongfully dissolved or dissociated to continue to use partnership
property to operate the business. Both also permit the deferral of payment to the partner
who wrongfully dissolved or dissociated, until the partnership's term has expired. 50 This
right is conditioned on securing payment of the former partner's share. 5 1 RUPA is more
friendly to continuation because it provides that, following a partner's wrongful
dissociation, winding-up of partnership business will occur only if it is the express will,
determined within ninety days following the dissociation, of at least half of the remaining
partners. 52 As a result, if a majority of the remaining partners so wish, they may continue
the partnership's business. However, the partnership agreement may eliminate this
possibility. As the statute is structured, continuation by the majority of remaining partners
53
is the default rule, subject to ouster by contrary provision in the partnership agreement.
In contrast, the partnership agreement may not oust the statutory provisions that govern
dissolution by court order or on the basis that carrying on the partnership has become
54
illegal.
Even with these mitigating elements, U.S. partnership legislation has been criticized
for its unwillingness to bind partners to the terms of their agreement. However, the critics
disagree about the preferable alternative. Professors Bromberg and Ribstein would make
a partnership agreement that explicitly limits a partner's power to dissociate specifically
enforceable. 55 In contrast, Professor Hillman would treat a partnership as indissoluble
when the partnership agreement specifies a particular term or undertaking, which is

48. 359 P.2d 41,44 (Cal. 1961).
49. REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(d) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2001) (imposing a duty of good
faith and fair dealing on partners in exercising rights and discharging duties to the partnership and to fellow
partners). The facts of Page itself are unlikely to trigger the good-faith duty imposed by section 404(d). In
Page, the partner who sought dissolution was also a creditor, and the attempted dissolution occurred when the
partnership's business took a turn for the better, but the amount of debt owing to that partner made it unlikely
that a third party would buy the partnership's assets. RUPA section 404(f) provides that a partner may "lend
money to and transact business with the partnership, and as to each loan or transaction the rights and obligations
of the partner are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to other applicable law." REV.
UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 404(f) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2001).
50. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 38(2)(b), (c)(HI) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 881 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§
701(h), 801(2)(ii) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 101, 108 (Supp. 2001). Under section 38(2)(b), whether a
partnership's business continues in the wake of a wrongful dissolution depends on whether all the remaining
partners "desire to continue the business in the same name, either by themselves or jointly with others." UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(b) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 881 (1995). Under RUPA section 801(2)(i), the business may continue
unless at least half of the remaining partners expressly wish to wind-up. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801(2)(i)
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 108 (Supp. 2001).
51. See UNIF. P'SHP ACT § 38(2)(c)(11) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 881 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 701(h)
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 101 (Supp. 2001).
52. REV. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 801(2)(i) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 108 (Supp. 2001). A partner who
dissociates within ninety days after another partner's wrongful dissociation does so rightfully. See id. §
602(b)(2)(i) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 2001). The rightful dissociation is treated as an expression of
will to wind up partnership business. See id. § 801(2)(i) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 108 (Supp. 2001).
53. See REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 44-45 (Supp. 2001).
54. See id. § 103(b)(8), 6 U.L.A. 44-45 (Supp. 2001).
55. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP §

7.03(d), at 7:60, n.23 (Supp. 1999-2).
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consistent with the Partnership Act of 1890.56 All agree on an underlying premise that in
negotiating the terms of their prospective association as partners, parties should be
permitted to strike a binding agreement that reflects each party's relative assessment of
the risks that the partnership will create and the benefits of assuring greater stability in
57
the association.
This underlying premise is, however, open to question if the risks created by the
agency that the partnership creates are more difficult than other business risks to assess at
the point of an initial agreement or if these risks are especially problematic in some other
way. The demographics of partnership are also relevant. In particular, reflecting its status
as the default form of organizational choice, general partnership law is applicable to
business associations in which parties may lack the sophistication to strike a closelytailored bargain reflecting a balance among risks and opportunities as perceived by each
participant, even following careful analysis and professional counsel. For example,
English authorities report that, at present, at least half of all partnerships have no
comprehensive partnership agreement. 58 This constituency may include members not
readily able to assess the risks created by operating a business as a general partnership. In
addition, these members are unlikely to obtain sophisticated professional assistance to
evaluate these risks so that they may be assessed in relation to benefits anticipated in a
structure that binds partners to membership on stated terms.
Another way to characterize U.S. partnership law is that it limits the extent to which
partners may use pre-commitment strategies to reduce the risk of subsequent defections.
A pre-commitment strategy consists of a person's voluntary actions that restrict future
options when the person realizes that her preferences may differ in the future from her
preferences at the time of committing. Pre-commitment may be rational when one
anticipates greater benefit from credibly committing to stay a particular course, despite
subsequent changes in preferences. For example, Ulysses pre-committed to staying his
navigational course and to sailing past the Sirens when he directed his crew to bind him
to the mast and to stop their ears against the Sirens' song. 59 The statutory power to
dissolve is, of course, antithetical to pre-commitment.
As it happens, an additional limit on pre-commitment comes from general contract
law. Suppose a partnership agreement provided that a partner who wrongfully dissolved
the partnership or dissociated from it would lose any right to any subsequent payment
from the partnership, including the return of the partner's capital account and any share
of profits to which the partner would otherwise be entitled. Such a provision is
enforceable only if it can be characterized as a reasonable estimate of damage that the

56. See Hillman, supranote 31, at 735.
57. See id. at 731; BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 55, at 7:59-:60.
58. See Elspeth Deards, PartnershipLaw in the Twenty-First Century,J. BUS. L., July 2001, at 357, 362.
59. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-47
(1979). Sometimes a pre-commitment strategy is not the wisest course. Ulysses would regret his crew's
compliance with his instructions if, once past the Sirens, he sighted a sea monster but was unable-the crew's
ears still being stopped-to warn them of the impending peril of being swallowed by the monster if the ship
does not change course. Likewise, if Ulysses misunderstands the risk that the Sirens pose, his pre-commitment
strategy may not be wise. For these points, see James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage,75 IND. L.J. 875,
945 (2000).
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partnership will incur, as opposed to a penalty. 60 Thus, contract law itself limits the
extent to which a partnership agreement may be structured to deter defections.
Additionally, many cases testing the limits of such provisions involve contests between a
partnership's remaining members and former partners engaged in competitive
activities. 6 1 Contract law does not enforce promises that restrain competition if they are
"unreasonable," a determination that considers whether the restraint is necessary to
protect the promisee's legitimate interests, whether it will result in hardship to the
promisor, and whether it is likely to injure the public. 62 These factors range beyond
partners' determinations of the advantage they mutually anticipate at the time they
structure their partnership agreement.
B. England
Similarly, the English legislation contains provisions that reduce the risks created by
the contract-dominated design choice. There are several grounds on which a partner may
petition the court for a decree of dissolution, including another partner's conduct that
prejudicially affects partnership business and, more generally, circumstances that make it
"just and equitable" that the partnership be dissolved. 63 To be sure, U.S. legislation states
similar bases on which a court may order dissolution or dissociation. 64 Additionally, in
both England and the U.S., dissolution occurs automatically upon the occurrence of a
65
partner's death or bankruptcy unless the partnership agreement otherwise provides. If
the other partners wish, a partnership may be dissolved if a partner's share becomes
subject to a creditor's charging order. 66 An unhappy partner in an English partnership
may thus benefit if dissolution occurs fortuitously, for example as a consequence of a
fellow partner's death or bankruptcy, because the partnership association then ends but
the unhappy partner has not repudiated the partnership agreement.
Moreover, this perspective provides a framework for explaining why, with the
exception of certain professional firms, English partnerships are illegal if they have more
than twenty partners. 67 Exceeding this number automatically dissolves the partnership on
60. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 151 (Cal. 1993) (holding that provision in partnership
agreement stating that partner would forfeit some or all rights to benefits upon withdrawal if partner entered
into competition with partnership was enforceable; the provision took only a "reasonable toll" on departing
partners who competed, and represented a reasonable attempt by the partnership to estimate damages from the
loss as opposed to an unenforceable penalty); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1266 (Mass. 1989)
(holding that partnership could not retain former partners' capital accounts and profit shares; capital
contributions and profit shares "are not a form of liquidated damages to which partners can resort in the event of
a breach" of the partnership agreement).
61. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 55, § 7.12(b)(2), at 7:178-:179 (Supp. 2001-1).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1981).
63. See Partnership Act, 1890,53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 35 (Eng.).
64. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 804 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601(5) (amended
1997), 6 U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 2001).
65. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 33(1) (Eng.).
66. See id. § 33(2); REV. UNIF. P'stlP ACT § 601(4)(ii) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 2001)
(partner may be dissociated following unanimous vote to expel if partner's transferable interest in partnership
has become subject to charging order that has not been foreclosed).
67. See LAW COMM'N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 1, at 56 (citing sections 716 and 717 of the
Companies Act of 1985 with regard to excepting firms of solicitors, accountants, and stockbrokers; also citing
section 4(2) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907, with regard to limited partnerships).
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the basis of illegality. 68 This limitation is difficult to justify, especially in a framework
largely dominated by contract, making it unsurprising that the Law Commission's
Consultation Paper identifies the size limit as an obvious target for abolition. 6 9 The
limitation may be explained, but not justified, by the risks created by a binding
contractual undertaking that makes one individually liable on the basis of others' actions.
One might sensibly proceed with caution before making such a commitment and might in
particular wish to have ample information about prospective fellow partners. The
statutory limit may represent a rough proxy for circumstances under which the cautious
would decide to proceed. However, this does not suffice as a justification for a mandatory
size limit: Individuals' preferences for undertaking risk vary, as do the risks a particular
business typically entails and the information available with which to assess risk.
V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

These underlying differences in general partnership law have implications outside
the realm of partnership. In the United States, business associates who wish to avoid the
instability of general partnership have many choices, including the long-standing choices
of incorporating the business or organizing as a limited partnership. An innovation of the
last couple of decades, limited liability companies (LLCs) are organized under statutes
that permit, like partnership, great organizational flexibility without the risk of individual
liability for LLC members. Although the statutes governing these forms differ, none
creates a power of dissolution or dissociation with the consequences that affect the
stability of a general partnership. 70 In this context, it is possible to understand the general
partnership as a "penalty default."'7 1 That is, many, if not most, organizers of business
firms may prefer characteristics that cannot be achieved through a general partnership;
the structure of general partnership law creates incentives to choose other organizational
forms. In contrast, in England, where the statute permits the formation of general
partnerships with greater stability, the incentive to look elsewhere for alternate
organizational choices may be weaker, as may be legislative incentives to produce them.
English authorities report that almost forty percent of businesses with more than one

68. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 34 (Eng.).
69. See LAW COMM'N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 1, at 56-59.
70. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (2000) (stating the procedure for dissolution of business
corporations, initiated by resolution adopted by corporations' directors and approved by vote of majority of
shares having the right to vote); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 801 (1976), 6A U.L.A. 240 (1995) (limited
partnership is dissolved as specified in its certificate or in limited partnership agreement; upon written consent
of all partners; or upon withdrawal of a general partner unless partnership has another general partner and
partnership agreement permits partnership business to be carried on by remaining general partner, or unless
within ninety days of withdrawal all partners agree in writing to continue and to appointment of one or more
general partners if necessary or desired); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801 (2000) (stating that an LLC is
dissolved as specified in LLC agreement; unless agreement provides otherwise, affirmative vote of two-thirds
of members effective to dissolve LLC).
71. This term was formally defined in the landmark article by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner. Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Fillingthe Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989).
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owner choose to be partnerships, which may reflect either a good fit between partnership
72
law and the needs of its users or the lack of better-fitting alternatives.
These basic differences may have further implications for other comparisons that
could be made. For example, are partners' fiduciary duties defined more broadly and
enforced more stringently in fixed-duration English partnerships than in partnerships
governed by U.S. law? Partners who are more firmly bound to each other by their prior
agreement may be more vulnerable to various forms of opportunistic and self-serving
conduct by fellow partners. It is noteworthy that the Law Commission's comprehensive
review of English partnership law does not propose any material change in partners'
fiduciary duties, including any articulation of the extent to which those duties may be
reduced by provisions in a partnership agreement. 73 The Law Commission proposes,
74
however, the addition of a statutory statement of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In contrast, RUPA section 404(b) limits fiduciary duties to those explicitly stated in the
Act. 75 While section 103(a) explicitly provides that the partnership agreement shall
govern partners' relations with each other, section 103(b) provides that an agreement may
not eliminate partners' fiduciary duty of loyalty. 76 Additionally, the Law Commission's
review does not propose any material revisions to the mandatory duty imposed on each
partner by section 28 of the Partnership Act of 1890 to "render true accounts and full
information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner or his legal
representatives." 77 RUPA, in contrast, permits a partnership agreement to restrict a
partner's right of access to partnership books and records so long as the restriction is not
unreasonable. 7 8 RUPA also appears to permit a partnership agreement to eliminate the
duty imposed on each partner and the partnership by section 403(c)(1) to furnish "without
demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably
72. See Deards, supra note 58, at 375. Aggregate data on the number of partnerships in the United States
does not always distinguish among all firms that file a partnership tax return-some of which are LLCs-and
firms that are organized as partnerships. For example, according to the 2000 edition of the Statistical Abstract of
the United States, in 1997, active "partnerships" numbered 1,759,000 with approximately $1.3 trillion in
business receipts. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl. 858
(2000). However, inclusion in the "partnership" category is based on tax-filing status, and thus may include
firms organized as LLCs. In the same period, 4,710,000 corporate tax returns were filed, including 2,452,000
filed by subchapter S corporations. Id. tbl. 862. Total corporate receipts amounted to approximately $16.6
trillion. Id.
Data derived from partnership tax returns, which ask whether the filer is organized as an LLC or a
partnership, illustrate that the number of LLCs has increased rapidly. In 1998, 470,657 LLCs filed a partnership
tax return, up from 349,054 in 1997 and 221,498 in 1996. Alan Zempel, PartnershipReturns, 1998, at 69, in
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Fall 2000 (on file with The Journal of
Corporation Law). In 1998, the number of LLCs exceeded the number of limited partnerships. Id. Like most
partnerships, most LLCs operate in the finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing and services sectors. Id.
The significance of partnerships in these sectors is a long-established trend. Id. at 62. In 1998, LLCs reported
$1.2 trillion in total assets, which represents 23.2% of total assets reported by all partnerships. Id. at 69. In all
industries in 1998, businesses that filed partnership tax returns reported total receipts of $1.8 trillion. Id. at 67.
73. See LAW COMM'N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 1, at 179-85.
74. Id.
75. REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2001) (limiting a partner's duty
of loyalty).
76. Id. § 103(a)-(b), 6 U.L.A. 44-45.
77. Id. at 179.
78. REv. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b)(2) (1994), 6 U.LA. 44 (1995).
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required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership
agreement."' 79 In this respect, RUPA is consistent with a pre-RUPA case that enforces
provisions in a partnership agreement that specified partners' rights to receive
information when the information was material to evaluating an offer received from the
managing partner to purchase their interests. 80 English authority, in contrast, stresses the
mandatory nature of the rights and duties created by section 28 of the Partnership Act of
1890, even when the transactional context is the purchase by one partner of another's
8
interest. 1
These basic differences may also carry implications for the relative extent to which
particular remedies are sought. For example, in fixed-duration English partnerships, is
more use made of judicial dissolution as a mechanism to allow exit from the firm?
Should the standards for judicial dissolution of a corporation on "just and equitable"
grounds be the same as those applicable to dissolution of a partnership? The differences
between partnership and corporate structures cut in opposite directions. A general
partnership's relative fragility means that more bases for exit may be available, in
contrast with the relative durability of a corporation. However, membership in a general
partnership, unlike shareholding, creates an ongoing risk of individual liability for
82
business obligations.
What to make of these differences in light of the recent availability, in both
countries, of limited liability options for general partnerships is open to question. The
Limited Liability Partnerships Act of 2000, like limited liability partnership (LLP)
legislation in the United States, makes it possible for two or more persons associated as
partners to register as a limited liability partnership. Eligibility for English LLP status is
not limited to professional services partnerships, although their concern about the risk of
increasing liability on claims of negligence led to the legislation. 8 3 Eliminating individual
partners' risk of liability to third parties for partnership obligations should significantly
reduce the unattractiveness of enforcing partnership agreements that bind partners to each
other for a fixed term. However, that risk remains present for partners who do not register
their partnership as an LLP, in particular the less sophisticated cohorts within the realm
of partnership. Partnerships that operate without a comprehensive written partnership
agreement-as at least half of English partnerships reportedly do84-may be unlikely to
register as an LLP, unless the newly-available prospect of limited liability spurs an
increase in the requisite attention to organizational formality.

79. See id. § 403(c)(1), 6 U.L.A. 81 (1995). Section 403(c)(1) is not explicitly insulated by section 103(b)
from the effects of contrary provisions in the partnership agreement.
80. See Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1300 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the general partner did
not breach the fiduciary duty owed to limited partners by purchasing limited partners' interests when
partnership agreement restricted limited partners' access to information material to value of their interests but
gave limited partners option of sharing the cost of independent valuation).
81. See MORSE, supra note 9, at 112-13.
82. For the point that simple analogies between partnership and corporate law can be misleading, see
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 249-50

(1991).
83. See JOHN WHITTAKER & JOHN MACHELL, LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS: THE NEW LAW, at v
(2001).
84. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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Interestingly, the Law Commission's thoughtful Consultation Paper on partnership
articulates a reform philosophy of enhancing the duration of partnerships. For example,
under the 1890 statute, a partner's death or bankruptcy automatically dissolves the
85
The Consultation
partnership unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise.
Paper questions whether the default should be shifted, such that a partner's death or
bankruptcy would dissolve only the relationship between that partner and the others,
86
unless the partnership agreement provides that it shall also dissolve the partnership. It is
likely, as the Consultation Paper observes, that this change would accommodate "the
presumed wishes of partners who have not provided for death or bankruptcy one way or
' 87
especially given that any of the partners could
the other in the partnership agreement,"
withdraw from the partnership if the agreement does not fix a term.
However, the preceding contrast with the U.S. material suggests another perspective
from which to assess the value of fortuitously occurring events that cause dissolution.
Under the Partnership Act of 1890, a fellow partner's death or bankruptcy may serve
fortuitously as an escape-hatch from a partnership when the agreement binds the partners
for a fixed term and the causes of unhappiness or nervousness for a would-be escapee
partner do not rise to the level that would furnish grounds on which to achieve escape
through court-ordered dissolution. Shifting the default permits the agreement to bind even
more tightly, which serves the interests of stability. Like the contract-dominated
perspective more generally, permitting an initial agreement to bind more tightly may
disserve the interests of partners who have reason to regret the commitment they
previously made in the partnership agreement. For good reason, contract law is generally
88
The general partnership,
unsympathetic to the regret that may follow a commitment.
however, combines a risk of direct individual liability with a flat organizational structure
that confers actual and apparent authority on all partners. It is not surprising that mature
legal systems, like England and the United States, vary in how these interests and risks
are resolved.

85.
86.
87.
88.

See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 33(1) (Eng.).
See LAW COMM'N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 1,at 67-69.
Id. at 68.
See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRE'TED DECISIONS

(1998). See also BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 55, § 1.02(b), at 1:25 (Supp. 1992-2) (observing that

statutory dissolution provisions are useful because "at the time of formation the parties may underestimate the
possibility of problems concerning breakup; negotiations over dissolution may result in disagreement that
causes the relationship to founder; and working out detailed provisions takes time and requires the expensive
services of an attorney"). But see Larry Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform
PartnershipAct, 46 BUs. LAW. 111, 147 (1990) (criticizing non-waivable power to dissolve as a "wholly-

unjustified restriction on private ordering").
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